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INTRODUCTION
Twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia provide for some form of
initiative procedure, allowing the citizens of a state to draft and pass legislation
without assistance from their state legislature From the first statewide referen-
dum placed on the ballot in Oregon in 1904 through 20o6, "there have been
2,231 statewide initiatives, with 909 (41%) of these being approved."2 In several
states, such as California and Maine, "the initiative has by general agreement
become the principal driver of policy."3 As these enactments become more
prominent vehicles for achieving policy goals, it is important to consider how
courts should go about interpreting the products of direct democracy.
Many of the tools normally used when interpreting legislatively enacted sta-
tutes cannot be employed effectively in the initiative context. 4 As cases like Ro-
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1. PHILLIP DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS
AND COMPARISONS 27-29 (1998); ELISABETH GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX:
INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION 16
(1999). Interestingly, direct democracy was a product of the early twentieth cen-
tury populist movement, and, as such, it is most commonly found in western
states with constitutions drafted during that period. See Nathaniel Persily, The Pe-
culiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, Referendum and Recall
Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 11 (1997).
2. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
524 (4 th ed. 2007).
3. PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST: CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA'S FUTURE
63 (1998).
4- The products of direct democracy are adopted through two processes: initiative
and referendum. An initiative is a tool that allows the electorate to petition that a
proposed statute or amendment to the state constitution appear on the ballot for
consideration by the entire voting population. A referendum is a method whereby
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mer v. Evans5 illustrate, "the interpretation of ballot measures [like initiatives] is
often extremely difficult, in part because they often are worded vaguely and in
part because the electorate's intent concerning their meaning is often quite spe-
culative."6 Given the inherent differences between statutes created by conven-
tional legislative efforts and those that are the product of direct popular action,
a different set of interpretive tools is necessary when attempting to ascertain the
meaning of an initiative. Because of these differences, and the typical relation-
ship between the drafters of initiatives and the body politic, this Comment sug-
gests importing an analytic paradigm from the realm of contract law: contra
proferentem. Resolving statutory ambiguities against the interests of the party
that drafted the initiative will help to address some of the problems inherent in
direct democracy efforts, aid in incentivizing clarity in draftsmanship, and pro-
vide a reliable interpretive tool for judges to use when resolving textual ambi-
guities.
The argument in favor of applying the doctrine of contra proferentern to the
products of direct democracy proceeds in three parts. First, the implications of
the different resources that are available when interpreting initiatives and legis-
latively enacted statutes are explored. Second, the motivations behind and justi-
fications for importing an interpretive doctrine from the realm of contract law
are discussed in detail. Finally, the potential effects of applying contra profer-
entem to ballot measures are considered, and the theory this Comment pro-
motes is distinguished from other proposals to deal with the interpretive issues
presented by initiatives.
I. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE STATUS QUO
State courts interpreting initiatives often purport to use the same analytical
techniques to resolve textual ambiguity that they apply when interpreting the
products of the conventional legislative process.7 Whether examining an initia-
tive or statute, judges look to the plain text of the statute and then apply inter-
pretive canons such as ejusdern generis or expressio unius exclusio alterius to re-
the electorate approves or disapproves of a law proposed by or already adopted by
the legislature. Since laws adopted via referenda typically have legislative history
and other analytical accoutrements associated with statutes enacted through the
normal legislative process, this Comment's arguments only apply to initiatives.
5. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating an initiative making antidiscrimination suits
more difficult for homosexuals to file); see also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967) (invalidating a state initiative that allowed landowners to refuse to sell or
rent for any reason).
6. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 2, at 558.
7. Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent": Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct
Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995) (arguing for the adoption of specific interpre-
tive canons for dealing with direct democracy and for the narrow interpretation of
its products).
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solve ambiguities in the text.' In tandem with conducting this analysis, courts
often attempt to derive the meaning of the phrase or words in question by ex-
amining legislative history. This resource, however, is conspicuously absent in
the case of initiatives. The analytical vacuum created by this administrative void
renders the normal interpretive rubric inadequate to the task of dealing with
uncertainties in statutes enacted by popular ballot.9 A paradigmatic example of
the resulting interpretive complications is found in courts' awkward efforts to
deal with equal protection challenges to statutes enacted by initiative. The legis-
lature's intent is frequently a key factor in an equal protection challenge to a
statutory scheme. But, "the Supreme Court... has [n]ever inquired into the
motivation of voters in an equal protection clause challenge to a referendum
election involving a facially neutral referendum unless racial discrimination was
the only possible motivation behind the referendum results."1 The nature of
initiatives makes inquiries into the motives of the body enacting the challenged
statute incredibly difficult, if not impossible."
As an empirical matter, discovering the intent of the general public in pass-
ing a ballot measure is extremely difficult when compared to ascertaining the
intent of legislative actors. Many of the sources consulted when interpreting leg-
islatively enacted statutes, such as legislative hearings and committee reports,
almost never are created in the initiative process. If a judge were to take the in-
quiry into textual intent seriously, as in the normal course of interpretation, she
would need to examine sources like the media coverage and advertising sur-
rounding a ballot campaign, "which social science research demonstrates affect
the voters much more than formal sources such as the text of the ballot propo-
sition and the official voter pamphlet distributed by the state."12 This type of
8. See, e.g., Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1405 (2008) ("[W]hen a stat-
ute sets out a series of specific items ending with a general term, [ejusdem generis
dictates that] that general term is confined to covering subjects comparable to the
specifics it follows."); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 73 (2002) (ex-
plaining that "the canon expressio unius exclusio alterius [means that] expressing
one item of an associated group excludes another left unmentioned").
9. While certainly a minority approach, some courts have been willing to look at the
literature accompanying initiatives as legislative history. See Whitaker v. Speigel,
Inc., 623 P.2d 1147 (Wash. 1981). To the extent that these resources are reliable at
all, they could be used to derive the intent of the promoting party in deciding am-
biguities against them.
10. Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 573 (6th Cir. 1986).
11. Some courts have been willing to review statistical data about the identity of the
parties that vote for or against a given measure, but the admissibility of this type
of evidence is far from generally accepted. See Kirksey v. Jackson, 506 F. Supp. 491
(S.D. Miss. 1981), affd, 663 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981).
12. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 2, at 1ol.
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analysis, however, likely will yield inconsistent results and is not the sort of
evaluation for which judges enjoy a comparative advantage. 3
While the Supreme Court has not discussed the problems that initiatives
present in any great level of detail, the Court is aware of them. Justice Ken-
nedy's appraisal of the statutory text at issue in Romer provides an instructive
example.14 In that case, Colorado passed an initiative preventing homosexuals
from raising claims based on discrimination in housing, employment, and oth-
er areas. While the Court ultimately invalidated the initiative on equal protec-
tion grounds, the opinion also addressed concerns with the statutory text. Ad-
dressing statutory language banning "any minority status, quota preferences,
protected status, or claim of discrimination" on the basis of sexual orientation,
Justice Kennedy observed that "[i]t is a fair, if not necessary, inference from the
broad language of the amendment that it deprives gays and lesbians even of the
protection of general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in
governmental and private settings."'5 If the statute had indeed been found con-
stitutional, contra proferentem could have been applied to at least prevent this
broad reading of the statute. 6
13. Even if a judge could accomplish the feat of deducing voter intent from available
media sources, disconnect likely would arise between what an analysis of this in-
formation would yield and the intention behind the text of the proposition. Con-
struing ambiguities against the drafters of the initiative most likely will result in an
interpretation that is closer to what the people adopted than to what the drafter
may have opaquely intended.
14. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). The statute at issue read in relevant part:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or depart-
ments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or
school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, or-
dinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the
basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any
minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of dis-
crimination.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3ob.
15. 517 U.S. at 630. As suggested by Justice Kennedy, the text of the Colorado provi-
sion could have been interpreted one of two ways: (i) as banning any sort of pro-
tection from discrimination against people based on their sexual orientation; or
(2) as banning only special preferences for people based on their sexual orienta-
tion.
16. The cases discussed in this Part are meant to be demonstrative of the issues in-
volved with interpreting ambiguous initiatives, but these cases are just the tip of
the iceberg. For a catalogue listing more than fifty cases and related descriptions
involving the interpretation of ambiguous initiatives, see Schacter, supra note 7, at
app. B.
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II. IMPORTING THE DOCTRINE OF CONTRA PROFERENTEM To DEAL WITH SOME
OF THE PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY DIRECT DEMOCRACY
The doctrine of contra proferentem as applied in contract cases maintains
that "when language supplied by one party is reasonably susceptible to two in-
terpretations, one of which favors each party, the one that is less favorable to
the party that supplied the language is preferred."'7 Many of the justifications
for this contract interpretation mechanism render it particularly appropriate for
use in interpreting initiatives. First, contra proferentem purports to resolve am-
biguities against the drafter because the drafter could have avoided the dispute
by crafting the language more clearly."8 The same is true in the initiative con-
text, since the drafter most often possesses unilateral control over the text that
will appear on the ballot. Despite this fact, initiative proposals can generate con-
siderable voter confusion.1 9 In fact, the literature accompanying initiatives is of-
ten "so complicated that one cannot understand what is going on."20 These
problems can be confounded by media campaigns, launched by the drafting or-
ganization, that distort the issues by portraying the initiative in a narrow way
when in fact the language submitted for approval is quite broad.' This confu-
sion possibly results from the "greater incentives for professionals in the initia-
tive process to deploy vague or even misleading language because voters might
be more easily manipulated than professional legislators." 2 Applying the doc-
trine of contra proferentern ideally will counteract these incentives and force
greater clarity in initiatives' text.
Some progress already has been made in restricting the ability of parties to
place proposals on ballots to mislead the electorate. Recognizing the potential
problems with overly complicated ballot initiatives, both state courts and legis-
lators have endorsed the application of the single-subject rule when drafting
initiatives.23 Under the single-subject rule, initiatives only may deal with a spe-
17. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.11 (3d ed. 2004); see
Lanier Prof'l Servs. v. Ricci, 192 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[A]mbiguous [contract
terms] will be construed against the drafter.").
18. Estrin Constr. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413, 419 (Mo. App. 1981)
("The principle that an ambiguous adhesion provision shall be given an intend-
ment favorable to the adherent rests on the public policy that the inept drafter of a
form had the resources to do better.").
19. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 2, at 530-33.
20. THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFER-
ENDUM, AND RECALL 74 (1999).
21. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 926-28 (3d ed. 2007).
22. Id. at 927.
23. See id.; see also Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject
Rule, 30 UCLA L. REV. 936 (1983) (discussing the application of the single-subject
rule).
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cific topic, helping to "avoid the possibility of logrolling, deceit, or voter confu-
sion."2 4 Construing ambiguities against the interests of the organization that
drafts the initiative will promote accuracy that in turn hopefully will result in
initiatives that are better drafted and more easily understood. Enhanced speci-
ficity also will make it harder for the sponsoring organization to engage in mis-
leading media campaigns, as the source material will be less susceptible to ma-
nipulation and multiple interpretations. Applying the doctrine of contra
proferentem to these provisions will serve as a court-applied compliment to the
statutorily created single-subject rule, forcing additional clarity in draftsman-
ship and resulting in more transparent ballot proposals.
A second reason that contra proferentern is an appropriate doctrine to adopt
in the initiative context is that it "applies with particular force 'in cases...
where the drafting party has the stronger bargaining position."'2 5 For two rea-
sons, this description accurately captures the relationship between the party
that drafts and advocates for an initiative and the portion of the electorate that
will be affected by it. First, direct democracy initiatives are most often under-
taken by well-financed, organized interest groups. 6 The successful conduct of
an initiative campaign requires hundreds of thousands of signatures. Because
states are constitutionally prohibited from regulating interest groups' compen-
sation of petition circulators or the amount of money that a group may spend
in support or opposition of a ballot measure, superior resources frequently
amount to electoral success. 7 Second, the lion's share of successful initiatives
enacted in the last decade has been characterized by entrenched, well-financed
interests resisting some form of desired change." One empirical account found
that voters adopted 78% of proposed initiatives restricting civil rights between
1959 and 1993, suggesting that the products of direct democracy might be detri-
24. St. Paul Citizens for Human Rights v. City Council of St. Paul, 289 N.W.2d 402,
407 (Minn. 1979).
25. Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1207 (2d Cir. 1970) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 232 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1970)).
26. BETTY ZISK, MONEY, MEDIA, AND THE GRASS ROOTS: STATE BALLOT ISSUES AND
THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 106 (1987); Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting,
and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1845 (1999).
27. See generally Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988) (holding that prohibiting the
payment of petition circulators violates the First Amendment); Buckley v. Am.
Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1998) (prohibiting states from requiring
that circulators be registered voters or disclose their names); DAVID S. BRODER,
DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF MONEY
(2000).
28. CRONIN, supra note 20, at 212 ("A perennial fear about direct democracy has been
that majorities at the ballot box might be less sensitive than state legislators to the
rights of minorities-whether an ethnic, racial, or religious minority or perhaps a
small ideological or partisan group."). These provisions often are supported by
focused interests that purport to represent the interests of the majority.
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mental to the reform efforts of minorities.2 9 Construing ambiguities against the
interests of the promoting organization will ensure that a superior democratic
bargaining position obtained through financial advantage or majority status
does not translate into a nefariously obtained legislative victory.
Finally, contra proferentem typically is applied to contracts where the terms
are of a "take it or leave it" nature-when one party does not have the ability or
opportunity to alter the terms of the agreement." This, too, is exactly the situa-
tion in the initiative context. Voters are presented with the proposed text when
they arrive at the ballot box and cannot negotiate the terms. By comparison, a
statute enacted by a legislature is somewhat analogous to sophisticated parties
entering into an agreement. There often are numerous compromises made
among the interests represented in the elected body, resulting in a policy that is
at least acceptable to a majority of those involved in its passage. In the case of an
initiative, no such compromise exists, making these statutes more like contracts
of adhesion than like bilateral contracts produced through negotiation. The all-
or-nothing nature of initiatives distinguishes them from other statutes and
makes them prime candidates for a strict interpretive rule like contra profer-
entem.
III. PROBLEMS WITH APPLYING CONTRA PROFERENTEM TO THE PRODUCTS OF
DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND OTHER SUGGESTIONS FOR DEALING WITH INTER-
PRETING INITIATIVES
Despite potential objections to the contrary, judges currently are well-
positioned to utilize the tools this Comment promotes. First, instead of asking
courts to embrace a completely novel concept, this Comment simply asks that
courts apply a doctrine they regularly use in a different context. Second, there
are numerous canons that could be described as analytical cousins of contra
proferentern that courts frequently apply when dealing with statutes, such as
rules of strict construction, the rule of lenity, and the canon of constitutional
avoidance. 3' Applying contra proferentem, then, is just an extension of analytical
practices already in existence.
29. Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245,
253 (1997). But see Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler, Responsive or Responsible Gov-
ernment?, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED
STATES 249, 266-70 (Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan & Caroline Tolbert eds., 1998)
(attacking Gamble's study and concluding that statutes passed by state legislatures
are just as likely as those passed via initiatives to impugn minority rights).
30. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
31. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005) ("The canon of constitutional
avoidance comes into play only when, after the application of ordinary textual
analysis, the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one construc-
tion ...."); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491-92 n.lo (1985)
("[CI riminal statutes must be strictly construed .... The strict-construction prin-
ciple is merely a guide to statutory interpretation. Like its identical twin, the rule
229
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
Although it seems that judges already are equipped to employ contract in-
terpretation tools when resolving ambiguous statutes, it is possible that apply-
ing the doctrine of contra proferentem to initiatives would have a chilling effect
on the overall production of initiatives. Similar to the economics- rooted argu-
ment made against the use of other substantively restrictive interpretive canons,
increasing the ex ante costs of pursuing a ballot initiative could ceteris paribus
result in a decrease in the number of initiatives.3 It is possible that construing
ambiguities against the drafter when interpreting the products of initiatives
could squeeze out some popular democratic proposals at the margin. It is not
clear, however, that it would be inherently undesirable to exclude potentially
misleading initiatives from the popular ballot when a party is unable to draft its
potential statute with sufficient clarity. While the calculus balancing statutory
clarity and volume is uncertain, it may be wise to adopt interpretive canons that
force parties to err on the side of fewer, more thoughtfully drafted initiatives
than on the side of more, vaguely worded, overreaching initiatives.
Finally, the citizenry may in fact participate in the formation of initiatives
beyond the simple casting of ballots. The more the body politic participates in
the development of and debate surrounding an initiative, the less applicable the
rationale supporting the application of contra proferentern becomes. But, as the
discussion up to this point suggests, and practical experience demonstrates, the
population at large frequently has little involvement in the initiative process be-
yond the vote. More often than not, "[tihere is no critical evaluation, input or
feedback from those in society who may be affected by the legislation; nor is
there the refining process that occurs in the legislature."33
Other scholars have proposed solutions to the interpretive problems posed
by initiatives, but these suggestions fail to address the unique problems pre-
sented by direct democracy. Elizabeth Garrett argues that, when possible, ballot
propositions should be understood as creating statutory law subject to amend-
ment by the legislature rather than constitutional amendment entrenched
against legislative modification.3 4 In making this argument, Garret suggests that
typical interpretive tools are sufficient when analyzing the text of initiatives.
This explanation, however, does not account appropriately for the unique rela-
of lenity, it only serves as an aid for resolving an ambiguity .... ) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
32. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influences of Economics on Law:
A Quantitative Study, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 385 (1993).
33. St. Paul Citizens for Human Rights v. City Council of St. Paul, 289 N.W.2d 402,
407 (Minn. 1979).
34. Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE
17, 35 (1997); see also Jack Landau, Interpreting Statutes Enacted by Initiative: An
Assessment of Proposals To Apply Specialized Interpretive Rules, 34 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 487 (1998) (arguing that there is no reason to apply differing interpretive me-
thods to the products of direct democracy and legislative efforts because the same
flaws occur in both interpretive processes).
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tionship between the initiative drafter and the voting population and fails to
provide the appropriate incentives to parties authoring initiatives. Getting clos-
er to the crux of the problem, Phillip Frickey argues that ballot initiatives
should be understood in accordance with the plain meaning of their text and
that ambiguous provisions should be interpreted narrowly. Doing so limits the
effects of direct democracy on existing statutory schemes enacted in accordance
with republican principles, i.e., by a legislature.35 While interpreting ambiguous
provisions narrowly may serve some ex ante accuracy forcing function, it fails
to do so to the same degree that a contra proferentem regime would. Also, while
narrow construction is a step in the right direction, it fails to account for the
disparities in resources and bargaining power among the parties to an initiative.
CONCLUSION
The importance of determining what interpretive tools are appropriate
when dealing with initiatives is greater now than ever before, as the products of
direct democracy are becoming more prevalent and often deal with controver-
sial areas of policy. Importing the doctrine of contra proferentem from contract
law would serve to improve the quality of these increasingly important democ-
ratic products and ensure that the rights of those affected by ballot measures are
protected more thoroughly.
35. Phillip Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct De-
mocracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477 (arguing that direct democracy is in tension
with the federal constitutional principle of republican government).

